Will the foot of the Ukrainian soldier stay on Russian soil?
war from behind the glasses of realism;
The effectiveness of Ukraine's attack on Kursk depends on the interaction of several factors, including military power, durability of foreign support, and strategic vision. After taking over the lands of Russia, Ukraine is facing the challenge of continuous innovation in the battlefield, resilience and strategic patience in order to maintain its achievements.
Political group of Anna Science and Technology News AgencyUkraine's attack on Kursk, located in the west of Russia, which happened on the sixth day of August, was not only a surprise, but also calculated to tickle the Russians' historical memory.
Located 400 km from Moscow, the city of Kursk is the site of the largest war in modern history, which became a turning point in the field battles of Europe. In this battle, which is also known as the “Battle of Tanks” and took place during World War II (1943), 3,000 German tanks faced 5,000 Russian tanks.
However, the attack on Kursk was a surprise for the Ukrainians themselves, because, contrary to their expectations, it was met with a cold-blooded reaction from Moscow. Perhaps Russian President Vladimir Putin's lack of haste to release territorial integrity is because his historical memory also works well: that year, the tank battle ended with the victory of the former Soviet Union.
For Putin's western rivals, his defeat in the Ukraine war is an ideal situation, but history has shown that Russia fails not because of external pressures, but rather under the influence of internal disunity.
We still cannot confidently answer the question whether “at the possible negotiating table with Russia, Kursk will become Ukraine's trump card or not”; But so far, one thing is clear: Kiev has failed to achieve its initial goal of diverting Russian forces from advancing on the eastern Ukrainian front, as Russia unexpectedly postponed the liberation of the Kursk territory to another date (early October at the latest). and did not order the troops to withdraw from eastern Ukraine.
But Kiev pursues at least three other goals in its attack on Ukraine:
*Getting points to force Russia to sit at the negotiating table or at least increase its bargaining power in case of holding any peace talks. At the same time, Russia says that the attack on Kursk has prevented any possibility of peace.
* Convincing Western allies that their military aid to Kiev is not in vain. Of course, the realization of this goal depends to a large extent on the outcome of the US presidential election and the continued control of the White House in the hands of the Democratic Party; Because the Republican Party – which is represented by Donald Trump in the 2024 competition, prioritizes ending the war and saving money through military aid to Kiev.
* Instilling a sense of hope in the people of Ukraine who, after two and a half years of war, have no hope of its end. Let's not forget that the attack on Kursk is not just a military maneuver, but a statement from Ukraine that the battle is still going on and the field has not been completely handed over to Russia.
In the meantime, the fact that the Ukrainians have advanced up to 40 kilometers from the Kursk nuclear power plant (the second largest power plant in Russia) creates two potential targets for them:
1. In addition to the “occupation of Russian lands” card, it also gives them the hope of using the “capture of the nuclear power plant” card, which can compensate for the capture of the “Zaproviya” nuclear power plant by Russia.
They evaluate the success rate of an invasion based on strategic effects and long-term consequences. That said, although initial progress appears to be limited, the real benchmark is Ukraine's ability to hold on to occupied territory.
2. It widens the presence of the limited forces of Ukraine and gives them the opportunity to escape the Russian blockade, especially considering that Moscow is not in a hurry to evict the Ukrainians, the duration of their presence on Russian soil is longer than they had previously predicted.
For Putin's Western rivals, his defeat in the Ukraine war is an ideal situation that is better not to be realized, because this option could lead the Russian president to press the button to start a third world war, most likely of a nuclear type.
After all, history has shown that Russia fails not because of external pressures, but more under the influence of internal disunity. For example, Russia withdrew from the First World War after the revolution of 1927 or ended the war in Afghanistan after the collapse of the former Soviet Union in 1989.
By now, even Putin's enemies appreciate the fact that he enjoys a good position in Russia, despite some opposition that is common in any government.
The effectiveness of Ukraine's attack on Kursk depends on the interaction of several factors, including military power, durability of foreign support, and strategic vision. After the acquisition of Russian lands, Ukraine should ask itself if it has the continuity of innovation in the battlefield, resilience and strategic patience necessary to preserve its gains.
Of course, since we look at the issue with the lens of realism, we do not intend to trivialize Ukraine's counter-attack on Kursk. History has shown that the success rate of an invasion is not evaluated based on initial achievements, but based on strategic effects and long-term consequences. That said, although initial progress appears to be limited, the true measure of Ukraine's ability to hold on to the occupied territories is the real measure.
On the other hand, Russia has also shown that, despite occasional failures, it is an extraordinary enemy with huge resources and the will to endure big failures. December is not far away and as Trump said, “Russia is the winter warrior”; The warrior who defeated the Germans and Napoleon. When the Russian winter arrives, not only the military strategy but also the infrastructure, the supply chain and the will of both sides of the war front will be challenged.